Respondent met the minimum evidentiary burden to show that he had been a legal resident in the county where he sought a House District seat at least one year prior to the date of the election. Respondent presented a lease agreement for a residence in the district and a document mailed to him at that […]
Homestead exemption only one factor in determining residency. Read More
Mr. Ralph Hudgens established that he was qualified to run for State Senate in District 47 through persuasive evidence that he was a legal resident of that district. The fact that Hudgens owned, and sometimes stayed in, property outside of District 47 did not disqualify him from candidacy in the absence of evidence that he
The requirement under Georgia law that the election of PSC Commissioners be held under “the same rules and regulations as apply to the election of [the] Governor” does not impose on PSC candidates qualification criteria identical to those of candidates for Governor, such as a six-year residency prerequisite. Accordingly, the fact that Michael DiPietro, a
DuBose Porter affirmatively established that he was qualified to be a candidate for the Georgia House of Representatives in District 143 through persuasive evidence of his legal residence therein. Porter’s legal residence in District 143 was not undermined by evidence of his ownership, and part-time residence, at a “camp house” located outside of District 143
Temporary residence without the intent to change domicile does not affect legal residence. Read More
A school district’s Functional Behavioral Assessment (FBA) was deemed inappropriate because the data collection did not provide reliable conclusions as to the functions of the Petitioner’s serious and problematic behaviors. Additionally, the school district erred in failing to perform a Functional Analysis (FA), which was necessary to identify the functions of the student’s violent and
School district ordered to reimburse the cost of behavior evaluations. Read More
Sankeralli v. the Department of Drivers’ Services, Judge Schroer held that the constitutionality of the roadblock that lead to the driver’s arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) is outside the scope of an Administrative License Suspension hearing, because the exclusionary rule, the remedy for unconstitutional searches and seizures, does not apply in an administrative
